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habit the premises and to pay rent, at the risk of facing eviction .
Even if the tenant were prepared to sue for repairs, it is not at all
sure whether many of the defects facing Eastmount tenants could
be considered items not constituting a "good" state of repair .
It is defects such as these, however, that are most offensive to
individuals caught in a seller's market for land that exists In most
urban areas . As a result, groups of tenants are increasingly taking
collective action, utilizing techniques that bring raw political and
economic power into play .
Some American states have regulated the rent strike, thus forbidding self-help by tenants and controlling and encouraging the
peaceful resolution of landlord and tenant disputes . These models
for regulation have been tried and tested . As with labour unions
and management, the regulation of tenants' unions would prove
beneficial both to tenants and landlords . The proprietal analogy
for "industrial peace" would certainly seem enhanced by the prospect .
It has been noted that few norms are more deeply embedded
in our culture, as verbal abstractions, than those which are frequently cited as justifying judicial or administrative intervention :
that the weak should be protected from the strong and that conflict should be settled peacefully ." The situation facing tenants
similar to those in the Eastmount apartments calls for intervention
for just those reasons .
JEFFREY J0WELL`

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-TRANSFER OF JUVENILE CASES To
ADULT COURTS-FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE JUVENILE DELINQUENTS ACT .-Reported cases may not provide very
accurate criminal statistics but recently there seems to have been an
increased number of cases' of juvenile delinquency which have
been transferred (or were sought to be transferred) to the adult
"Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964) .
Jeffrey Jowell, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
1 should like to express my gratitude to my research assistant Miss Ruth
Ann Irving, of Osgoode Hall Law School, for the help she gave me in
preparing this comment .
' E.g ., Regina v . Simpson, [1964] 2 C .C .C. 316 (North Bay Juv . Ct),
Re Regina v . Arbuckle, [1967] 3 C .C .C . 380, (1967), 59 W.W .R . 605
(B .C .C .A .) ; Regina v . Shoemaker, [1966] 3 C .C .C. 79 (B .C .S .C.) ; Rex
v . H, [193i] 2 W .W .R . 917 (Sask . K .B .) ; Regina v . P.M .W . (1955), 16
W.W.R . 650 (B .C. Juv . Ct) ; Re L .Y. No . 1 (1944), 82 C.C.C . 105 (Man .
C .A .) ; Re Rex v . D .P.P . (1948), 92 C .C .C . 282 (Man . Q.B .) ; Regina V .
Sawchuk (1967), 1 C .R .N .S. 139 (Man . Q .B.) ; Regina v. Miller (1961),
132 C.C.C . 349 (Sask . Q .B .) ; Regina v . M ., [1964] 2 C .C .C . 135 (Man .
Q .B .) ; Regina v . Liefso (1965), 46 C .R . 103 (Ont . S .C .) ; Regina v . Cline,
[1964] 2 C .C .C. 38 (B .C .S .C .) ; Regina v . Pagee (No . 1) (1963), 41
W.W .R . 159 (Man. Q .B .) ; Regina v . Trodd, [1966] 3 C .C.C . 367 (B .C .
S.C .) .
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court. The incidence of waiver cases varies from province to province and from juvenile, court to juvenile court. One of the busiest
juvenile courts,in Canada, the court of Metropolitan Toronto, has
not waived a juvenile case in the last twenty years. On the other
hand, during one week in July, 1969, the British Columbia
Supreme Court has considered two waiver cases' These two cases
provide an interesting contrast in the legal approach to the juvenile
delinquent . Another waiver case from British Columbia has just
been reported,' and provides the most balanced view of all three.
The question of waiver is considered important because we
subscribe to the philosophy that a juvenile (under sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen years, depending on the provincial .jurisdiction)
who does some anti-social act is different from an adult criminal
and should be treated accordingly. This is well expressed'in section
38 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act' where it is laid down' that a
child should "be treated, not as a criminal, but as a misdirected
and misguided child, and one needing aid',, encouragement, help
and assistance" . This is to be achieved by therapeutic rather than
punitive measures . Since its inception, the juvenile court has employed enlightened methods, such as probation, which have eventually received wider use and acceptance, in the adult courts and institutions . The juvenile court has been a laboratory for ideas in
handling problems of social deviance . This. court for children has
been strongly influenced by behaviourist, and determinist ideas
which denied the notions of blameworthinss and free will found
in the ordinary criminal law and which are based on the classical
school of criminology as practised by such strict, adherents to the
Judeo-Christian ethic as James Fitzjames Stephen. The founders of
the juvenile court, who were dedicated to social work, had high
hopes for their creation . For many reasons, including their exaggerated hopes, the juvenile court did not put an end to. juvenile
delinquency and, consequently, adult crime did not disappear.
Perhaps the increased incidence of waiver cases can be attributed
to a disillusionment among juvenile court judges who have not
"reformed" delinquent children by friendly counselling, stern
warnings, probation or enforced detention in training schools.
These judges may also have been influenced by the popular cries
of "Law and Order", "Crime on the Streets" and the adult resentment of today's freedom-loving, uninhibited, undisciplined, hedonistic, alienated and troubled Youth. This spate of contradictory
adjectives may not describe a juvenile delinquent but they are no
more arbitrary and inexact than the definition found in the -Juve2 Regina v. Beernan (1969), 69 W.W .R. 624 (B .C.S.C .) aff'd (1970), 71
W.W .R . 543 (B .C .C.A,) ; Regina v . Proctor (1969), 69 W .W.R . 754 (B .C .
S .C.) .
3 Regina v. R . (1969), 70 W.W.R . 292 (B .C .S .C .) .
' S .C., 1929, c . 46, now R.S.C ., 1952, c. 160 .
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nile Deliquents Act. Section 2(h) of that legislation defines a
"juvenile delinquent" as :
. . . any child who violates any provision of the Criminal Code or any
Dominion or provincial statute, or of any by-law or ordinance of any
municipality, or who is guilty of sexual immorality or any similar form
of vice, or who is liable by reason of any other act to be committed
to an industrial school or juvenile reformatory under the provisions of
any Dominion or provincial statute;' . .

A delinquent is defined as less than eighteen years in some provinces (such as British Columbia) and as young as sixteen years in
others (such as Ontario) . The delinquent act can vary from murder, and other serious Criminal Code offences, to minor infractions
of city by-laws. Fortunately, there are limitations on the cases
of juvenile delinquency which can be waived to the adult courts .
The child must have allegedly committed an indictable Code offence and must be "apparently or actually over the age of fourteen years" .' The only guidance given to the juvenile court judge
in making his decision to give up jurisdiction to an ordinary
criminal court is that "the good of the child and the interest of
the Community demand it".' Most of the cases have involved
serious charges such as murder, arson and rape . Waiver has been
upheld on appeal in about half the cases (but, of course, only a
very small percentage of juvenile cases are waived in the first
instance) . The reasons given in these decisions show little understanding of the juvenile delinquent or of the philosophy of the
juvenile court. The courts have discussed the juvenile court's inadequacy as a tribunal to try serious crimes, the lack of procedural
protections in that court, the need to give a child a fair trial, the
public's "right to know", the inadequacy of treatment available
to the juvenile court and the community's need to see justice done
in a public trial. Very few cases have made a close examination
of the problem ; ironically, these rare cases are ones in which
waiver has been refused or quashed.
Regina v. Beeman is primarily concerned with procedure.
Originally, an allegation had been made in the family and children's court of Vancouver that Beeman "did commit a deiInquency
in that he . . . unlawfully did attempt to commit an act of gross
indecency with another male person". Pursuant to section 9 of the
Juvenile Delinquents Act, the case was transferred to the ordinary
courts . Beeman elected to be tried by a judge without a jury and,
after a preliminary hearing, was committed for trial. Subsequently,
the Crown preferred an indictment charging Beeman with counselling another to commit the offence of gross indecency, rather
than attempted gross indecency. The British Columbia Supreme
' Ibid.

'Ibid., s. 9.
7
Ibid.
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Court, per 1Vlacdonald J. decided that "valid proceedings had been
initiated against the accused in the ordinary courts"' and that
section 478(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code' could be used
by the Crown to substitute the offence of counselling for that of
attempt. Beeman's counsel argued that this was improper and that
the case should have been returned to the juvenile court as soon
as a different charge was laid . 1Vlacdonald J. took the view that
section 478(2) was fatal to the appellant's case . Beeman argued
that when another charge was substituted, the juvenile court should
have been given the opportunity to rescind the order (as provid3d
by section 9(2) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act) . The learned
judge distinguished Regina v. Goodfrrend" on which Beeman
placed strong reliance . In that case, a juvenile had originally be--n
charged with unlawful possession of marijuana for the purpose of
trafficking. When he appeared before the magistrate, the Crown
withdrew this charge and substituted a charge of unlawful possession. The juvenile pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeal quashed
the conviction on the submission that the magistrate was without
jurisdiction . 1Vlacdonald J. distinguished this case on the basis that
the initiating step in the proceedings in Beeman was valid and
unchallenged and therefore the magistrate conducted a pre'_iminary
inquiry with full jurisdiction to do so . Therefore, in the judge's
words, Beeman was "beyond recall to the juvenile court" ."
It is not my intention to write a technical criticism of the
procedural issues in this case . To one relatively untutored in the
niceties of criminal procedure, the distinction between Goodfriend
and Beeman seems minuscule. To someone more interested in the
quality of juvenile justice, the disposition of the Beeman case
seems a little difficult to follow . The whole basis of criminal procedure, particularly when interpreted by the vigilant eye of an
appellate court, is to ensure that justice be not only done but also
be seen to be done . If a juvenile is involved in the criminal process,
then this judicial proverb should be applied with more circumspection, greater equity and, perhaps, less strict adherence to procedural exactness. Let us compare the two cases. In Goodfriend,
the second charge laid against the juvenile was less serious than
the original . In Beeman, the amended charge of counselling was
more severe than the original attempt charge ." Goodfriend had
pleaded guilty to the second charge while Beeman had sought, by
means, inter alia, of mandamus, to defeat the indictment . The
a Supra, footnote 2, at
s S.C ., 1953-54, c. 51 .

p. 629.

i° (1968), 65 W.W.R . 189 (B.C .C.A.) .
l' Supra, footnote 2, at p. 629.
lz See the following provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code, supra,
footnote 9, s. 149 (punishment for gross indecency), s. 406 (b) (punishment for attempt), s. 407 (punishment for counselling) . The punishment
for counselling is twice that of attempt.
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adult courts have shown that they are deeply concerned with the
problem of drug-taking youth and are prepared to impose severe
deterrent sentences." The charge against Goodfriend involved
drugs but he won his appeal . (The court's usual policy on drugs
should not be condoned and the reference back to juvenile court
was, no doubt, correct.) Beeman's offence was one of sexual
deviance . Without knowing all the facts, one would assume that
such behaviour in a juvenile calls for treatment rather than punishment and such disposition could be best dispensed by a sympathetic
juvenile court. Beeman's case remained under the jurisdiction of
the adult court.
The judgment of Macdonald J . took no account of the policy
underlying the Juvenile Delinquents Act. The factors set out in
section 38 seem to have been ignored by the learned judge who
also ignored the social differences between the two cases as outlined above . In distinguishing Goodfriend. Macdonald J. should
also have taken into account the social factors which McFarlane
J .A. in Goodfriend saw as perhaps overriding the strict legalistic
principles of criminal procedure. We might also note that the
decision in Goodfriend was one of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal, a superior court to that presided over by Macdonald J.
The decision in Regina v. Proctor, and the factors taken into
account by Munroe J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court,
are in stark contrast to the result in the Beenian case. While it
is realized that Proctor was a simple waiver case, some of the
judicial discretion wisely used in Proctor could have been profitably applied by Macdonald J. in the other case. Proctor has another unusual quality; it was one of those fairly rare cases where
a superior court decided that the juvenile court judge should not
have given up jurisdiction over the juvenile. Furthermore, Munroe
J. seems to have a good understanding of the philosophy of the
juvenile court .
Criticism of Beenaan or any other waiver case should not be
taken as an indication that no juvenile case should ever be waived
to the adult court. In many instances, the waiver of a juvenile
case should indicate that the philosophy of the juvenile court is
inapplicable or that the resources of juvenile justice are inadequate
or have failed in previous attempts to help the delinquent child.
Such cases should be rare because juvenile institutions should have
the best facilities and the authorities should be most hesitant before
giving up on efforts to help juveniles . Too frequently, young men
and women of sixteen to twenty-one years are incarcerated in
adult institutions and learn nothing but the trade of crime from
more sophisticated and old criminals. (The ideal solution may be
"E.g. Regina v. Simpson, [1968] 2 O.R . 270 (Ont . C .A .) . Regina v.
Martin (1969), 70 W.W .R . 282 (C.C . Co . Ct) .

19701

Comments

341

special forms of treatment for this intermediate group whose
members are so impressionable and whose habits are still capable
of improvement.)
' Unfortunately, many waiver cases result in trials in the adult
court and incarceration in adult institutions because juvenile
and appellate court judges apply erroneous reasoning in ordering
waiver . The rationale of section 9 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act,
"The good of the child- and the interest of the Community" is too
frequently construed in 'a retributive way so that the court is
really saying that the public will not tolerate this "junior criminal"
being treated as a "misdirected and misguided" child. The child
must be punished in "the interest of the community" . On other
occasions, the juvenile ;court judge waives a serious case because
he does not want the responsibility of a trial under the adversary
system applying strict rules of evidence . In some instances, which
are the saddest of all, the case is waived because the jurisdiction
has no treatment facilities for a seriously disturbed child or adolescent who has committed a major offence.
At first sight, the juvenile court judge appears to have made
the correct decision in refusing to proceed with Proctor as a juvenile . Munroe J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court did not
agree, however, and ordered the appellant to be "tried" under
the Juvenile Delinquents Act. Possibly, the first judge was correct
and appeals from' juvenile court waivers may be unfortunate because a Supreme Court justice is not an expert in juvenile delinquency and has not had the benefit of observing the juvenile on
previous occasions when he may have failed on juvenile probation
or has abused the social welfare philosophy of the Court for children . The indications in Proctor seemed most unpromising; the
juvenile was seventeen years and ten months at the time of the
alleged offence and was more than eighteen years at the time of
the appeal . He was accused of armed robbery of a trust company.
In 1965 and 1960, he had been adjudged delinquent on five occasions for thefts . At the time of the alleged robbery, he was on bail
for two alleged offences of breaking and entering and theft in
Toronto (where, of course, he was classed as an adult) . There was
further evidence that he had been adjudged delinquent in Ontario
when he was eleven . Despite all these liabilities, one's instincts
suggest that Munroe J. nevertheless made the proper decision .
Proctor was the product of a "broken home" and had "never
known adequate parental control or discipline" ." These factors
certainly do not differentiate Proctor from many juvenile delin
quents (or adult criminals) before the courts . The appellant was
fortunate because Munroe J . found a unique quality in this case
and took the opportunity to apply individualization of treatment.
14

supra, footnote 2, at p. 757.

342

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL . XLVIII

While Proctor was in jail awaiting trial, he came under the influence
of a Constable Foster of the Vancouver city police force . The constable, who found the young man "a fairly decent young fellow",
"got to thinking that he needed a break" ." The constable also told
the court: "I have seen a lot of prisoners, young and old, go
through jail in three years and this is the only one I have taken
a liking to."" Constable Foster and his wife offered to take the
juvenile into their own home and to raise him with their own
children. The police officer had made arrangements for the employment of Proctor .
Munroe J.'s assessment of the juvenile can best be described in
the judge's own words:
. . . that he needs and is likely to respond favourably to supervision
and discipline; that he needs the opportunity to develop self-control and
to form a close tie with a substitute for a father and with mature
adults, in the hope that he might absorb their standards ; that he has
no family, relatives or friends behind him anywhere ; that he has had
some training as an apprentice jockey; that he is mentally immature
and emotionally insecure ; that he is a lonely boy given to crying spells ;
that he has a heart-ache and needs affection ; that in any penal institution he might find colleagues in crime. but in a home he would probably
find brothers in life; that he has a potential for good; that institutional
control is less likely to benefit him than is the atmosphere of a normal
home; that he is susceptible to good influences as well as to bad ones,
especially at this time."

The learned judge also took into account that Proctor could
be brought before the court by a probation officer any time before
his twenty-first birthday if he should be in breach of probation.
He also placed a heavy reliance on the desirability of Proctor
avoiding a criminal record and that it was in the interest of the
community if Proctor could be rehabilitated and kept out of penal
institutions . In his wisdom, Munroe J . realised that penal institutions have a poor record of success. He referred to the Commissioner of Penitentiaries' remarks that "what is required is to put
this juvenile in a setting where he can live and work next to persons who can bring out the admiration of the juvenile ; whom the
juvenile will try to imitate, and whom we hope he will remember as
good sound sensible persons whom he would like to be like"."
His Lordship then added the sad, but true, fact that "the major
shortcoming in our prison system today is too few instructors of
that calibre with too many inmates and lack of adequate training
facilities"."
Proctor is a rare case-an enlightened judge providing, for a
juvenile, an excellent placement with responsible and concerned
"Ibid.,
=s Ibid .
1' Ibid.,

at p . 756 .

"Cited,
19 Ibid.

at p. 757.
ibid., at p. 759 .
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citizens . This surely reflects the true philosophy of the Juvenile
Delinquents Act.
The latest British Columbia case, Regina v. R. 2° also concerns
waiver but from a different perspective . The juvenile, aged sixteen,
was charged with one act of forgery and three of uttering . Eight
youths were involved and all but two were juveniles . In the northern community of Prince Rupert, the judge of the family and
children's court also wears another hat as adult court magistrate .
The judge-magistrate waived the case' of R to the adult jurisdiction
without any application from the Crown, and without any evidence
being taken other than proof of the child's age. ®n the face of it,
the only factor taken into account was the magistrate's pronouncement that "under the circumstances . . . the good of the
child and the interest of the community demanded"" the "raising"
of the case as the magistrate termed it . In fact, the judge had
further data although none of it was presented in court ; he had
consulted privately with two probation officers and had had prior
knowledge of R as a result of another act for which R had been
adjudged delinquent some six weeks previously . In his report to
the appeal court, the judge had also intimated that one of the
reasons for waiving the case was the lack of juvenile treatment
facilities available in the Prince Rupert area ." This too had not
been mentioned in court at the time of waiver .
The appellant delinquenf submitted that no proper notice of
the transfer was given and that there was "no evidence properly
before the learned judge on which he could properly reach the
conclusion he did" ." - .
Rae J. upheld the appeal and made a careful examination of the
case law. He found support for his decision in the judgment of
Pastin J. in Regina v. Pagee (No. 1)24 where the Manitoba Court
of Queen's Bench held that a waiver application was a "very
serious proceeding and the inconvenience of having another magistrate conduct the subsequent hearings should not interfere with a
complete and searching inquiry" ." The serious quality of the proceeding is reflected in the criteria which Pastin J. applied :
I interpret the words "the good of the child" to mean the treatment
which will provide the eventual welfare of the child by eradicating its
evil tendencies and transforming its character. I interpret the word
"community" to mean society at large"
And:
Is the limited treatment provided by . . . the Juvenile Delinquents Act
of a nature to reform him or is he so mature or so incorrigible that
"Supra,
footnote 3 .
22

21 Ibid., at p. 294.
Cf. the citation from Regina v. Arbuckle, supra, footnote 1, at text
accompanying footnote 31, infra.
Za
Ibid ., at p. 295.
24 Supra, footnote 1 .
Z S Ibid., at p. 191.
26 Ibid., at p. 190.
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his reclamation needs the harsher treatment provided by the Criminal
Code 27
Similarly, Rae J. relied on Regina v. At-buckle," where Mc-

Farlane J.A ., while admitting that a waiver decision required a
"substantial exercise of administrative discretion"," decided that
the judge must "establish facts and must act judicially in the sense
of proceeding fairly and openly . . . giving proper consideration to
the views and representations of the parties before him"." The
inquiry would be of "a quite general nature into the background,
character, conduct, education and potential of the child as well
as the nature and facilities of the community" ."
Rae J. also referred to the decisions of British Columbia courts
in Rex v. Benson and Stevenson32 and Regina v. Dolbec" where
the hearsay evidence of probation officer's pre-sentence reports
was successfully attacked . Of course, these cases were both adult
cases and stricter evidentiary rules usually apply in such cases.
A more informal procedure has been customary in the juvenile
court. If, however, a juvenile case is likely to be waived to the
adult court, then the courts should insist that the juvenile's rights
are given full protection or the doubtful case should always result
in the juvenile case being left in the non-criminal court.
The procedure adopted by the juvenile court judge in Regina
v. R." has all the ingredients found in the landmark decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Kent" and Gault." Although
the United States court did not go so far as to say that all. elements
of "due process" (as described in the United States constitution)
should be applied to juvenile court proceedings that court did
suspect, however, that the juvenile was receiving the worst, instead
of the best, of the two worlds of criminal justice and social welfare
which are joined in the juvenile court. Fortas J. stated that this
denial of justice had to be stopped. The juvenile court judge in
Regina v. R. had acted with little regard for the rights of the
juvenile in that case and the greatest of the procedural sins committed was not the dual roles of juvenile court judge and adult
court magistrate played by this member of the judiciary . The
evidence presented in open court was minimal and the rights of the
juvenile were flagrantly disregarded. The erroneous flavour of the
case is that the onus of proof is upon the juvenile to show that the
Ibid.
Supra, footnote 1 .
29 Ibid., at p. 609.
"Ibid., at p. 601.
31
Ibid., at p. 609.
32
(1951), 3 W.W.R. (N .S.), 29 (B .C .C .A .) .
33 [19631 2 C.C .C. 87 (B .C.C.A.) .
3a Supra, footnote 3 .
"Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S . 541 (U .S. Sup. Ct) .
"Re the Application of Gault (1967), 384 U.S. 997 (U.S. Sup. Ct).
27
23
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case should not be waived . This is surely contrary to the philosophy
of the Juvenile Delinquents Act and the need for the juvenile court
to act in "the best interests of the child" . The need for some
semblance of due process in the juvenile court does not mean of
course that sociological data should not be taken into account but
these factors must be produced in open court (subject to problems of professional privilege) and must be scrutinised by the
juvenile and his counsel. These protections cannot be limited to
the waiver cases. A decision to send a child to a training school
(or perhaps even label him a juvenile delinquent) must be given
proper judicial, consideration.
What is "proper judicial consideration"? In this regard, perhaps, Regina v. R. contains a hidden agenda . In Regina v. R.,
Rae J. specifically states" that he is not concerned with the merits
of the waiver decision. The learned judge makes some broad statements, however, which could have a very wide application . Although there are one or two oblique disclaimers by the judge that
he is not making broad policy statements about the juvenile court,
this case may have a future potential for changing the operation of
juvenile courts in all their cases, not just those where an allegation of juvenile delinquency is transformed into an indictment of
heinous crime. .
When Rae J. discusses the behaviour of the juvenile court
judge in Regina v. R., he reminds us that the remarks of McFarlane J.A . in Regina v. Arbuckle are to be read while remember
ing that the case was one of waiver . Rae J. goes on, however,
to discuss the important decision of the House of Lords in Official Solicitor to Supreme Court v. R." and the meaning of "being
administrative and ministerial" . That case concerned the care and
custody of wards of the court of chancery which operates on a
basis of parens patriae which is also the supposed rationale of the
juvenile court. This concept is best summarized in the phrase "the
best interests of the child" .
In this connexion, the remarks of Lord Devlin are cited :
Save in so far as their powers are limited by statute, all judges do as
they think fit. But what "they think fit" is not determined by their collective wisdom and embodied in judge-made rules. In the field of procedure these rules are those which Upjohn, L.J . in the Court of Appeal
rightly called "the ordinary principles of a judicial inquiry" . They include the rules that all justice shall be done openly and that it shall
be done only after a fair hearing; and also the rule that is in point here,
namely, that judgment shall be given only upon evidence that is made
known to all parties. Some of these principles are so fundamental that
they must be observed by everyone who is acting judicially, whether he
is sitting in a court of law or not; and these are called the principles of
natural justice."
a' Supra, footnote 3, at p. 304.
as 119651 A.C . 201, [19631 3 All E.R . 191 (H .L .) . "Ibid., at p. 237.
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Similarly, Lord Hodson had said in the K case that "it is
contrary to natural justice that the contentions of a party in a
judicial proceeding may be overruled by considerations in the
judicial mind which the party has no opportunity of criticizing or
controverting because he or she does not know what they are . . ."."
Both the House of Lords in the K case and Rae J. in Regina v.
R. make it clear that the administration of the pareras pairiae
jurisdiction does not preclude deciding the issue on judicial principles. Rae J. put it in these terms :
Because the jurisdiction in the juvenile court is administrative and, in
a measure, perhaps parental, does not, in my view, warrant the judge
of the court acting on information and knowledge in the manner in
which it was done here . The practice in question cannot pass the test
of necessity, only the test of convenience or expediency ."

Perhaps the importance of Regina v. R. is that future waiver
decisions of the juvenile court will be arrived at with much more
circumspection. Despite Rae J.'s disclaimers, perhaps His Lord
ship's decision is of prime importance because it is putting juvenile
court judges on notice that, in future, the juvenile's rights must be
more stringently protected, particularly before the juvenile is
thrown to the retributive wolves of the adult courts . Furthermore,
the decision in Regina v. R. has the flavour of a case which is
demanding minimal elements of a fair trial for all juvenile cases .
GRAHAM PARKER''

Ibid., at p. 234.
"Supra, footnote 3, at p. 300.
*Graham Parker, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
4°

